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In the interest of equal protection and justice, injured plaintiffs 
are no longer limited in their ability to recover damages for their 
pain and suffering. The abolition of previously imposed non-eco-
nomic damage caps in medical malpractice cases throughout the 
United States marks a dynamic example of the courts’ shift towards 
favoring more complete compensation for the most severely injured 
plaintiffs over the state’s interest in discouraging exorbitant damage 
awards and managing insurance premiums. Development of the law 
tends “to generate litigation in which the limits of revised principles 
are tested.”1 The issue of the legality of non-economic damage caps 
in personal injury cases demonstrates the principle that develop-
ments in the legal system tend to result in legal disputes.2 Questions 
regarding the constitutionality of non-economic damage caps have 
been continuously litigated throughout both the United States and 
Canada. This has led to significant controversy between the most 
severely injured plaintiffs seeking compensation for their pain and 
suffering and the defendants being held liable in such cases. In the 
case of non-economic damage caps, the courts in Canada reference 
legal developments in the United States when resolving its own sim-
ilar legal issues. 
This article explores the current constitutionality of caps on non-
economic damage awards in medical malpractice actions in Florida 
                                                                                                             
 1 Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, Report on Compensation 
for Non-Pecuniary Losses, 76 L.R.C. 1, 5 (1984). 
 2 See id. 
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and across various Canadian provinces.3 Part I provides an introduc-
tion to the current non-economic damage caps climate and the most 
significant decisions shaping that climate. Part II discusses the Su-
preme Court of Florida’s decision in N. Broward Hosp. Dist. v. 
Kalitan,4 and the precedent relied on by the Kalitan court, Estate of 
McCall v. United States.5 Part III begins with a comparative intro-
duction to the United States and Canadian legal systems and dis-
cusses the background and precedent that established the non-pecu-
niary damage award caps in Canada. Part IV compares the constitu-
tional challenges made to the caps in both Florida and Canadian 
provinces, and the court’s’ reasoning in each case. Part V discusses 
the likelihood that the Supreme Court of Canada will similarly find 
non-pecuniary damage award caps in medical malpractice actions 
unconstitutional as an Equal Protection violation. This article con-
cludes with a prediction that Canada will follow in the footsteps of 
the United States and rule that non-pecuniary damage award caps 
are unconstitutional. 
The United States plays a central role in the controversy sur-
rounding non-economic damage award caps and has long been con-
sidered the trendsetter for the judicial systems of other countries ‘on 
this issue.6 In the United States, non-economic damages, also re-
ferred to as non-pecuniary damages, are characterized as non-mon-
etary, intangible losses suffered by an injured plaintiff.7 Non-eco-
nomic damage awards are intended to “make the plaintiff whole” by 
compensating the plaintiff for “non-pecuniary harm caused by mal-
practice.”8 Non-economic damages and non-pecuniary damages are 
                                                                                                             
 3 See generally N. Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Kalitan, 219 So. 3d 49 (Fla. 2017). 
 4 Id. 
 5 See Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 894 (Fla. 2014). 
 6 Selina Koonar, Justice Systems in Canada and the United States, 
http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/commit-
tees/CL983500pub/newsletter/200906/koonar.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2018) 
(“Canada’s legal system is quite open to using case precedents from both England 
and the United States when there are insufficient ones in the realm of Canadian 
law.”). 
 7 See Allyson Fish, Noneconomic Damage Caps in Medical Malpractice Lit-
igation: Finding a Solution That Satisfies All Affected Parties, 17 NEXUS: CHAP. 
J. OF L. & POL’Y 135, 136 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 8 Id. 
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one in the same.9 Non-pecuniary harm includes the following: “pain 
and suffering, mental and emotional anguish, inconvenience, de-
creased quality of life, and loss of consortium, society, companion-
ship, love, and affection.”10 Non-economic damages “cannot be 
compensated solely based on the principle of restitution in in-
tegrum,”11 meaning that the plaintiff cannot be restored to his or her 
original position had no injury been suffered.12 As non-economic 
damages are not quantifiable, the calculation of non-economic dam-
age awards is difficult and uncertain.13 Further, “[s]ince no ‘objec-
tive yardstick’ exists for gauging non-pecuniary damages into mon-
etary value, this form of damages is characterized by vastly lavish 
claims.”14 The jury may award non-economic damages at its discre-
tion based on the circumstances of each individual case.15 In an ef-
fort to counterbalance this wide discretion, legislatures have created 
non-economic damage caps in medical malpractice claims in an ef-
fort to limit the plaintiff’s recovery and ensure judicial uniformity 
and fairness.16 
In Kalitan, a Florida plaintiff, Susan Kalitan, brought a medical 
malpractice action against multiple defendants, seeking damages for 
severe injuries suffered after carpal tunnel surgery.17 The case was 
first filed in June of 2008, and the trial court reached a’ verdict in 
June of 2011.18 The jury awarded Kalitan more than USD $4.7 mil-
lion; however, the trial court reduced the non-economic damages 
                                                                                                             
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Donna Benedek, Non-Pecuniary Damages: Defined, Assessed and 
Capped, 32 R. J. T. n.s. 607, 616 (1998). 
 12 What is RESTITUTIO IN INTREGRUM?, THE L. DICTIONARY, 
https://thelawdictionary.org/restitutio-in-integrum/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2018). 
 13 Fish, supra note 7, at 137. 
 14 Benedek, supra note 11, at 617; Herbert Kritzer, Guangya Liu & Neil Vid-
mar, An Exploration of “Noneconomic” Damages in Civil Jury Awards, 55 WM. 
& MARY L. Rᴇᴠ. 971, 976 (2014) (“Critics claim that the non-economic portion of 
awards if often much greater than the actual economic loss, suggesting that emo-
tion rather than reason influence juries.”); Lee v. Dawson, [2006] B.C.J. No. 679, 
para. 8 (Can.) (awarding CAD $2,000,000 in non-pecuniary damages, which was 
later reduced to CAD $294,600).“”“” 
 15 Benedek, supra note 11, at 617–18. 
 16 Fish, supra note 7, at 137. 
 17 N. Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Kalitan, 219 So. 3d 49, 50 (Fla. 2017). 
 18 Barry Univ., Inc., v. Kalitan, 2012 WL 6962692 1, 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). 
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award by nearly USD $3.3 million.19 In July of 2015, the defendants 
appealed the trial court’s decision.20 The Fourth District Court of 
Appeal directed the trial court to reinstate the total damages awarded 
by the jury, holding that “[p]er McCall, Plaintiff’s non-economic 
damages were improperly limited by the application of the caps in 
[S]ection 766.118.”21 Subsequently, in 2017, the Supreme Court of 
Florida granted review, holding that the statutory limits22 imposed 
on non-economic damages in medical negligence suits violated the 
Florida Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause’s provision that “all 
natural persons, female and male alike, are equal before the law.”23 
The court’s decision relied heavily on the court’s previous decision 
in McCall,24 reasoning that to arbitrarily reduce a plaintiff’s com-
pensation, regardless of the degree of injury suffered by the plaintiff, 
bore no rational relationship to the State of Florida’s interest in ad-
dressing the medical malpractice crisis.25 The Florida Legislature 
feared that exorbitant non-economic damage awards would result in 
increased medical malpractice liability insurance rates, forcing phy-
sicians to practice without insurance, avoid risky operations, retire 
prematurely, or flee Florida altogether.26 
Similar to the courts in the United States, the Supreme Court of 
Canada concluded that because “non-pecuniary damages is the area 
where the risk of an excessive burden of expense is most significant, 
it is in turn the domain where there is the clearest grounds for mod-
eration.”27 Because “[n]o money can provide true restitution” for 
                                                                                                             
 19 Kalitan, 219 So. 3d at 52. 
 20 Id. at 56. 
 21 Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 909 (Fla. 2014). 
 22 Benedek, supra note 11, at 617–18.§ §  
 23 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
 24 See McCall, 134 So. 3d at 894. 
 25 N. Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Kalitan, 219 So. 3d 49, 56 (Fla. 2017). 
 26 McCall, 134 So. 3d at 909. 
 27 Benedek, supra note 11 at 617–18; see also Peter C. Coyte et al., Medical 
Malpractice–The Canadian Experience, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 89, 89 (1991). 
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non-pecuniary damages, awards may be extravagant as they are de-
termined through a qualitative jury inquiry.28 Constitutional chal-
lenges to the statutorily imposed non-economic damage caps con-
tinue to flood courtrooms throughout the United States and Can-
ada.29 
In British Columbia, Canada, in Lee v. Dawson,30 the plaintiff, 
Ik Sang Lee, brought a personal injury claim against multiple de-
fendants for severe injuries suffered in an automobile accident.31 
There, the jury awarded Lee CAD $2,000,000 in non-pecuniary 
damages.32 This greatly exceeded the legally imposed non-pecuni-
ary damage cap, which was then CAD $294,600.33 The trial judge 
reduced the non-pecuniary damage award to the rough upper limit, 
and Lee appealed to the Canadian Court of Appeals.34 Lee argued 
that the non-pecuniary damage cap violated the equal protection 
guarantee of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.35 The 
Court of Appeals held that it was bound by stare decisis,36 namely, 
a trilogy of Canadian Supreme Court cases,37 and as a result, tbe 
Court of Appeals could not rule in Lee’s favor.38 However, the Court 
of Appeals reasoned that “the rationalization or conceptual under-
pinning for having a rough upper limit on non-pecuniary damages 
                                                                                                             
 28 Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229, 261 (Can.) 
(considering factors including compensation for physical and mental pain and suf-
fering endured and to be endured, loss of amenities and enjoyment of life, and 
loss of expectation of life). 
 29 Benedek, supra note 11, at 611. 
 30 Lee v. Dawson, [2006] B.C.J . No. 679, para. 2 (Can.). 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. at para. 8. 
 33 Id. at para. 1. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. at para. 17 (explaining that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms is equivalent to the United States Bill of Rights). 
 36 See discussion of the principle of stare decisis infra. 
 37 See Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229, 261 
(Can.); see Thornton v. Prince George School Dist. No. 57, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 267, 
267 (Can.); see Arnold v. Teno, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 287, 288 (Can.). 
 38 Lee v. Dawson, [2006] B.C.J. No. 679, para. 90 (stating that in 1978, the 
Supreme Court of Canada decided a trilogy of cases, establishing non-pecuniary 
damage award caps). 
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[should] be re-examined.”39 Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Can-
ada declined to hear Lee without reason.40 In declining to hear Lee, 
the Supreme Court of Canada forfeited its opportunity to examine 
the constitutionality of the non-pecuniary damage caps imposed by 
its precedent. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Exploring the American and Canadian courts’ treatment of the 
damage cap requires a basic understanding of the structure and func-
tion of both nations’ court systems and underpinnings of tort awards. 
A. The United States Federal Court System: An Overview 
The United States Court System has “two parallel and sovereign 
judicial systems.”41 The federal system applies federal laws, while 
the state system applies state laws.42 The primary role of the court 
in the United States is to “decide what really happened” in a partic-
ular controversy and “what should be done about it.”43 The United 
States is a democracy comprised of fifty states.44 The Supreme 
Court is the chief court in the United States.45 There are a total of 
ninety four district trial courts and thirteen appellate courts below 
the Supreme Court.46 The ninety four district trial courts are divided 
into twelve regional circuits.47 Each regional circuit has its own ap-
pellate court.48 The role of the appellate court is to determine if the 
                                                                                                             
 39 Id. 
 40 Matthew Good, Non-Pecuniary Damage Awards in Canada–Revisiting the 
Law and Theory on Caps, Compensation and Awards at Large, 34 THE ADVOC. 
Q. 389, 390–91 (2008). 
 41 Koonar, supra note 6. 
 42 Id. 
 43 ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., Court Role and Structure, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure (last vis-
ited Oct. 2, 2018). 
 44 See generally About the Organization of the U.S. Government, U.S.A.GOV 
(Updated March 21, 2018), https://www.usa.gov/organization-of-the-us-govern-
ment. 
 45 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., supra note 43. 
 46 ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., supra note 43. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
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lower court correctly applied the law.49 Appellate court decisions 
are made by a panel of three judges, rather than a jury.50 The district 
courts “resolve disputes by determining the facts and applying legal 
principles to decide who is right.”51 Typically, a district court judge 
tries the case, and the jury makes the ultimate decision.52 
Stare decisis, one of the most basic principles of the United 
States judicial system, is “the notion that courts will follow prior 
decisions of the same or higher courts unless sound reasons exist for 
departure.”53 Stare decisis ensures that judicial decisions are “based 
on sound principle rather than personal opinion.”54 Stare decisis 
“promotes predictability[,] . . . institutional stability and effi-
ciency.”55 Further, “[a] system of binding precedent also creates im-
petus for judges to state reasons and principles for distinguishing 
current decisions from past ones, and to push to get the defects in 
past opinions corrected.”56 The Supreme Court of the United States 
typically defers to its past decisions when making future decisions.57 
However, the Supreme Court may decide to depart from the doctrine 
of stare decisis if a previous decision is “unsound”58 or “unworka-
ble.”59 In addition, the Supreme Court considers an evolving under-
standing of the circumstances “now versus the time the precedent 
was decided.”60 The Supreme “Court repeatedly has cautioned that 
                                                                                                             
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., supra note 43. 
 53 Arthur H. Bryant & Richard Frankel, Comments on Proposed Federal Rule 
of Appellate Procedure 32.1, TLPJ FOUND. 1, 6 (Feb. 14, 2004), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/03-AP-406.pdf. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 411, 464 (2010). 
 56 Bryant & Frankel, supra note 53. 
 57 Timothy Oyen, Stare Decisis, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST. (Up-
dated Mar., 2017), https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/stare_decisis. 
 58 Kozel, supra note 55, at 416 (meaning that “the Court might explain its 
decision to overrule a precedent by asserting that the precedent is ‘badly rea-
soned.’”). 
 59 Oyen, supra note 57 (meaning that decisions may be “unworkable” when 
the legal theory cannot be fairly applied to real cases). 
 60 Kozel, supra note 55, at 426. 
2019] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW 203 
 
stare decisis is a flexible ‘principle of policy’ as opposed to ‘an in-
exorable command.’”61 The Supreme Court has moved away from 
a strict “legalistic theory” and now “anchor[s] the law to new social, 
economic and political concepts, which have taken form in the slow 
process of social change.”62 Like the Supreme Court, most appellate 
courts have maintained the presumption against overruling estab-
lished precedent.63 “There appears to be a widespread assumption 
that statutory stare decisis is simply part of our interpretive doc-
trine.”64 
B. The Canadian Federal Court System: An Overview 
Although the Canadian and American system both originate 
from the common law system, the two Federal Court systems have 
key differences.65 Unlike in the United States, the Canadian system 
is a unified system, meaning that the Supreme Court of Canada and 
all lower courts are part of the same system.66 Like the American 
system, the primary role of Canadian courts is to administer jus-
tice.67 Canadian courts interpret and apply Canada’s constitution, 
common law, and government legislation.68 Canada is a constitu-
tional monarchy comprised of ten provinces and three territories.69 
Canada has four levels of courts, each with its own jurisdiction.70 In 
each of the ten provinces, with the exception of Quebec, the Cana-
dian judiciary consists of provincial and territorial courts, superior 
                                                                                                             
 61 Id. at 414. 
 62 Wendell E. Green, Stare Decisis and the Supreme Court of the United 
States, 4 NAT’L B. J. 191, 195 (1946). 
 63 Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 
THE GEO. WASH. L. REV. 317, 327 (2004-2005). 
 64 Id. at 328. 
 65 Koonar, supra note 6. 
 66 Id. 
 67 GOV’T OF CAN., How Does Canada’s Court System Work?, DEP’T OF JUST. 
(Updated Sept. 9, 2016), http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/ccs-ajc/01.html 
(“[S]ignificant societal changes may also prompt the Court to overrule precedent; 
however, any decision to overrule precedent is exercised cautiously.”). 
 68 Id. 
 69 N.Y.U., Guide to Foreign and International Legal Citations, 1 J. OF INT’L 
L. AND POL. 1, 26 (2006). 
 70 GOV’T OF CAN., How the Courts are Organized, DEP’T OF JUST. (Updated 
July 27, 2017), http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/ccs-ajc/02.html. 
204 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:195 
 
courts, and courts of appeal.71 The highest court is the Supreme 
Court of Canada, which presides over the entire judiciary system.72 
The provincial and territorial courts manage most cases and are 
established by provincial and territorial governments.73 Superior 
courts have complete jurisdiction and handle more consequential 
cases and hear appeals from the provincial and territorial courts.74 
Provincial and territorial courts of appeal hear appeals from the de-
cisions of the superior courts and the provincial and territorial 
courts.75 The decisions of the court of appeals can only be appealed 
to the Supreme Court of Canada.76 The Federal Court and the Fed-
eral Court of Appeals correspond to the provincial and territorial 
court systems.77 The judges of these courts of appeal travel across 
Canada to hear cases involving actions rooted in federal statutes, 
national security, and international affairs.78 The Federal Court acts 
as Canada’s national trial court and may review the decisions of 
most federal boards, commissions, and tribunals.79 The Federal 
Court of Appeals reviews decisions of the Federal Court, Tax Court 
of Canada, and judicial reviews of some federal tribunals.80 Again, 
its decisions can only be appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.81 
The Supreme Court of Canada is the final court of appeal and has 
                                                                                                             
 71 See The Quebec Judicial System, EDUCALOI, https://www.edu-
caloi.qc.ca/en/capsules/quebec-judicial-system (last visited Oct. 1, 2018). Quebec 
has its own legal system based on French law and the Napoleonic Code. Id. The 
Quebec court system includes municipal courts, the Court of Quebec, the Superior 
Court of Quebec, and the Court of Appeal of Quebec. Id. The Supreme Court of 
Canada is ultimately the highest court in Quebec. Id. 
 72 See generally N.Y.U., supra note 69. 
 73 GOV’T OF CAN., supra note 70. 
 74 Id. (finding that more serious civil and criminal cases “include divorce 
cases and cases that involve large amounts of money”). 
 75 Id. 
 76 GOV’T OF CAN., Courts and Other Bodies Under Federal Jurisdiction, 
DEP’T OF JUST. (Updated Sep. 22, 2016), http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/ccs-
ajc/03.html. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
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jurisdiction over all actions.82 The Supreme Court has one Chief Jus-
tice and eight additional justices appointed by the federal govern-
ment.83 The Supreme Court of Canada solely hears cases that it 
deems to be of public and national significance.84 Once a case has 
exhausted all available lower level appeals, the Supreme Court of 
Canada still has discretion to grant or deny permission to appeal be-
fore it will hear a case.85 These requests for appeal can be granted or 
denied by the Supreme Court of Canada without reason.86 
In Canada, the principle of stare decisis is “the idea that courts 
ought to stand by their previous decisions[,] . . . is not immutable.”87 
Like its American counterpart, the Canadian judicial principle of 
stare decisis is defined as “the doctrine of precedent, according to 
which the rules formulated by judges in earlier decisions are to be 
similarly applied to later cases.”88 The doctrine of stare decisis en-
sures judicial consistency and predictability in similar cases and 
“that prior decisions of higher courts are binding on lower courts of 
the same jurisdiction.”89 Lower courts are typically expected to fol-
low all pronouncements of higher level courts.90 Today, the Su-
preme Court of Canada, as well as the provincial and territorial 
courts of appeal, are not strictly bound by prior decisions.91 The Su-
preme Court of Canada may “overrule on its previous decision when 
it is compelled to do so . . . .”92 The Supreme Court of Canada has 
flexibility and can set aside or overrule previous decisions when 
there is good reason.93 This more flexible application of stare decisis 
doctrine allows the Canadian courts “to restate the law in keeping 
                                                                                                             
 82 GOV’T OF CAN., supra note 76. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. (noting that some situations warrant an automatic right to appeal). 
 86 Id. 
 87 Neil Guthrie, Stare Decisis Revisited, 31 ADVOC. Q. 448, 448 (2006). 
 88 John E.C. Brierley, Stare Decisis, HISTORICA CAN. (Updated July 24, 
2015), http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/stare-decisis/. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Adryan J.W. Toth, Clarifying the Role of Precedent, 22 DALHOUSIE J. OF 
LEGAL STUD. 34, 41 (2013). 
 91 Brierley, supra note 88. 
 92 Toth, supra note 90, at 42. 
 93 George F. Curtis, Stare Decisis at Common Law in Canada, 12 U. BRIT. 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (1978). 
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with changed wants and expectations in those areas where the law 
has lagged behind the times.”94 
C. The Fundamental Right of Equal Protection 
Both the United States and Canada have Equal Protection 
Clauses. In the context of equal protection, both the Supreme Court 
of the United States and the Supreme Court of Canada share a com-
mon goal: “to reconcile the principal of equal protection with the 
clear reality of the consequence of law making that legislation com-
monly impacts groups unevenly.”95 
1. The American Equal Protection Clause 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
declares that “[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws.”96 Similarly, the Florida 
Constitution states that “all natural persons, female and male alike, 
are equal before the law . . . .”97 The right to equal protection allows 
all individuals “to stand before the law on equal terms . . . to enjoy 
the same rights as belong to, and to bear the same burden as are 
imposed upon others in a like situation.”98 When a government ac-
tion is challenged on equal protection grounds, the court employs 
one of three tests: the rational basis test, the intermediate scrutiny 
test, or the strict scrutiny test.99 Which test applies is determined by 
the type of legislative action in question.100 
                                                                                                             
 94 Id. at 14. 
 95 Joseph M. Pellicciotti, The Constitutional Guarantee of Equal Protection 
in Canada and the United States: A Comparative Analysis of the Standards for 
Determining the Validity of Governmental Action, 5 TULSA J. OF COMP. & INT’L 
L. 1, 7 (1997). 
 96 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 97 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
 98 Caldwell v. Mann, 26 So.2d 788, 791 (Fla. 1946) (citing Southern Ry. Co. 
v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400, 412 (1910)). 
 99 Pellicciotti, supra note 95, at 3. 
 100 Id. 
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2. The Canadian Equal Protection Clause 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, part of the Ca-
nadian Constitution, has a similar Equal Protection Clause to that of 
the United States Constitution.101 In addition, similar to the Florida 
Constitution, one of the purposes of the British Columbia Human 
Rights Code is to “promote a climate of understanding and mutual 
respect where all are equal in dignity and rights.”102 Section Fifteen 
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms states that “[e]very 
individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the 
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimina-
tion . . . .”103 However, in Section One, the Charter provides a caveat 
for legislation challenged as a violation of equal protection under 
Section Fifteen.104 Section One states that equality rights are “sub-
ject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be de-
monstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”105 Therefore, 
a discriminatory legislative action may be constitutional if the action 
is justified under Section One of the Charter.106 Unlike the United 
States, when a government action is challenged on equal protection 
grounds, the court always employs the same test to determine Sec-
tion Fifteen of the Charter is violated.107 If a violation has occurred, 
the court then considers whether Section One justifies the stated dis-
crimination.108 
Under the Canadian Constitution, judicial decisions are incon-
clusive.109 Meaning, “[t]he government can make the policy deter-
mination that a given law is necessary for the public welfare that it 
should be enacted, despite the judiciary’s advice that the proposed 
law violates the Charter.”110 
                                                                                                             
 101 See Constitution Act, 1982, C 11 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, app II, 
no 44 (Can.)’. 
 102 Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c 210 (Can). 
 103 Constitution Act, supra note 101’. 
 104 See Pellicciotti, supra note 95, at 6–7. 
 105 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 106 Id. at 7. 
 107 Id. at 8. 
 108 Id. at 9. 
 109 Robert A. Sedler, Constitutional Protection of Individual Rights in Can-
ada: The Impact of the New Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 59 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1191, 1234 (1984). 
 110 Id. 
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D. Non-Economic Damages: An Overview 
Economic damages are easily quantifiable as they represent lost 
earnings, which have monetary values.111 However, non-economic 
damages, also referred to as non-pecuniary damages, as a general 
matter, are not easily quantified because non-economic damages do 
not represent financial (i.e., wage-based) losses.112 Non-economic 
damages include the following: “pain and suffering, inconvenience, 
physical impairment, mental anguish, disfigurement, loss of capac-
ity for enjoyment of life, and other non-financial losses to the extent 
the claimant is entitled to recover such damages under general law, 
including the Wrongful Death Act.”113 Non-economic losses have 
no monetary or market value and are not determined on a monetary 
scale.114 Although non-economic damages are non-financial, such 
damages “symbolically affirm that the plaintiff has been wrongfully 
deprived of something of value.”115 Non-economic damages “com-
pensate the plaintiff through a symbolic sum” because the plaintiff 
cannot be made whole.116 The “Canadian function approach” sug-
gests that  non-pecuniary damages “‘may somewhat re-establish the 
plaintiff’s self-confidence, wipe out his sense of outrage,’ or ‘may 
be a consolation, a solatium.’”117 This approach suggests that non-
pecuniary damages provide solace, meaning a dollar amount “that 
allows the plaintiff to purchase physical arrangements that can make 
life more endurable in the face of the non-economic loss.”118 
Nevertheless, calculating the appropriate amount of compensa-
tion for damages that have no monetary value is especially diffi-
cult.119 In both the United States and Canada, non-economic damage 
awards are “within the jury’s discretion.”120 Fact finding is left to 
                                                                                                             
 111 See generally Harry Zavos, Monetary Damages for Non-monetary Losses: 
An Integrated Answer to the Problem of the Meaning, Function, and Calculation 
of Noneconomic Damages, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 193, 195 (2009). 
 112 FLA. STAT. § 766.202(8) (2017). 
 113 Id. 
 114 Zavos, supra note 111, at 196–99. 
 115 Id. at 197. 
 116 Id. at 198. 
 117 Id. at 197. 
 118 Id. at 245. 
 119 Jack Effron, A Comparative Study of Non-pecuniary Damages in Common 
Law Countries, 10 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 211, 211 (1988). 
 120 Id. at 213–17. 
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the jury so that it “can tailor the award to the unique circumstances 
of the plaintiff’s injuries, as well as represent community stand-
ards.”121 Judgments by Canadian trial and appellate level courts 
“suggest[] that non-pecuniary damages are calculated much like 
pain and suffering damages in the United States. The court picks a 
sum that it feels fairly represents the gravity, duration and effect of 
the injuries on the plaintiff.”122 
1. United States Non-Economic Damages 
In the United States, non-economic damages are awarded to 
compensate injured plaintiffs for their “pain and suffering, emo-
tional distress, loss of consortium or companionship, and other in-
tangible injuries.”123 Further, non-economic “damages involve no 
direct economic loss and have no precise value.”124 In the United 
States, non-economic damage limits in personal injury actions are 
imposed by individual state statutes rather than by a uniform federal 
law.125 Federally imposed damage caps would not be “subject to 
challenge under state constitutions [or] vulnerable to federal consti-
tutional challenges under existing precedents.”126 However, past 
proposed legislation was never approved.127 
Currently, only four states—Florida, Illinois, New Hampshire, 
and Washington—have found non-economic damage caps in per-
sonal injury cases unconstitutional.128 Only eleven states impose 
non-economic damage caps in general tort or personal injury 
cases.129 In medical malpractice cases specifically, the following six 
                                                                                                             
 121 Id. at 213. 
 122 Id. at 218. 
 123 Noneconomic Damages Reform, ATRA, http://www.atra.org/issue/none-
conomic-damages-reform/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2018). 
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 125 See generally Leonard J. Nelson, III, David J. Becker, & Michael A. Mor-
risey, Medical Liability and Health Care Reform, 21 HEALTH MATRIX: J. OF L.-
MED. 443, 445 (2011). 
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states have found non-economic damage caps unconstitutional: Al-
abama, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, New Hampshire, and Washing-
ton.130 Over half of the United States, twenty six states to be exact, 
impose non-economic damage caps in medical malpractice cases.131 
2. Canadian Non-Pecuniary Damages 
In Canada, non-pecuniary damages are awarded for the follow-
ing non-quantifiable injuries: pain and suffering, loss of companion-
ship, emotional distress, loss of life enjoyment, and loss of life ex-
pectancy, similar to non-economic damages in the United States.132 
Mirroring their United States counterpart, non-pecuniary damages 
in Canada are awarded for similar non-quantifiable injuries and in 
order to put the plaintiff in the same position that he or she would 
have been in but for the negligent injury.133 In order to obtain non-
pecuniary damages, “the plaintiff must demonstrate a reasonable or 
fair function which the money claimed will serve.”134 In other 
words, “non-pecuniary damages should be awarded only when they 
can serve some useful purpose.”135 Both the United States and Can-
ada place similar caps on non-economic damage awards.136 
In Canada, non-pecuniary damage awards for pain and suffering 
were limited to CAD $100,000 in 1978, which is currently upwards 
of CAD $370,000 after adjustment for inflation.137 The damages cap 
                                                                                                             
 130 Id.; see Nelson, supra note 125, at 458. 
 131 N.Y. LAW SCH., supra note 128. 
 132 Katherine L. Ayre & D. Bruce Garrow, The Recovery of Non-Pecuniary 
Damages in Canada: The Cap on Recovery, Jury Trials, and other Unique Con-
siderations for General Damage Awards, CONF. ON INT’L AVIATION LIABILITY & 
INS. 1, 3 (2009), http://monmexique.com/5-Garrow.pdf. 
 133 Id. at 3–4. 
 134 Lindal v. Lindal, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 629, 638 (Can.) (quoting Beverley M. 
McLachlin, What Price Disability? A Perspective on the Law of Damages for 
Personal Injury, 59 CAN. BAR REV. 1, 12 (1981)) (“[W]hat is a reasonable or fair 
function may involve reference to the restitutionary concept of what the plaintiff 
would have enjoyed or have been able to provide for his dependents had he not 
been injured.”). 
 135 Lindal, 2 S.C.R. at 638. 
 136 See Ayre, supra note 132, at 4. 
 137 Id.; see Non-Pecuniary Damages Upper Limits, MCKELLAR STRUCTURED 
SETTLEMENTS (2017), http://www.mckellar.com/statistics (last visited Oct. 1, 
2018). 
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is imposed regardless of the severity of the plaintiff’s injury.138 Fac-
tors that influence non-pecuniary damage awards include the fol-
lowing: age of the plaintiff; nature of the injury; severity and dura-
tion of pain; disability; emotional suffering; loss or impairment of 
life; impairment of family, martial, and social relationships; impair-
ment of physical and mental abilities; and loss of lifestyle.139 Factors 
irrelevant to non-pecuniary damage awards include the following: 
sympathy for the plaintiff, retribution against the defendant, emo-
tional adjustment of the plaintiff, social status, income, or assets of 
the plaintiff, and the sex of the plaintiff.140 In Andrews v. Grand & 
Toy Alberta Ltd.,141 Justice Dickson, writing for the Supreme Court 
of Canada, stated that “[t]he monetary evaluation of non-pecuniary 
losses is a philosophical and policy exercise more than a legal or 
logical one,” thereby illuminating the court’s prioritization of social 
good over legal theory.142 To echo this tenet, Justice Dickson stated 
that awards must be fair yet arbitrary because “[n]o money can pro-
vide true restitution” in cases of such great harm.143 
III. CASE SUMMARY 
A. The United States: The Fundamental Court Cases Barring 
Non-Economic Damage Caps in Florida 
On June 8, 2017, in Kalitan, which is now the current rule in 
Florida, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the statutory cap on 
wrongful death non-economic damages in medical malpractice ac-
tions, under Section 766.118, Florida Statutes, violated the right to 
                                                                                                             
 138 Ayre, supra note 132, at 4. 
 139 Stapely v. Hejslet, [2006] 34 B.C.C.A., ¶ 46 (Can). 
 140 Edward Veitch, The Implications of Lindal, 28 MCGILL L. J. 116, 122–23 
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 141 Andrews, 2 S.C.R. at 261. 
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equal protection afforded by the Florida Constitution.144 The Su-
preme Court of Florida based its decision on McCall, another Su-
preme Court of Florida case decided just three years prior.145 
In Kalitan, in 2011, plaintiff Susan Kalitan brought an action for 
medical malpractice, arising from the negligence of multiple medi-
cal practitioners and other defendants.146 Suffering from carpal tun-
nel syndrome, Kalitan went to defendant North Broward Hospital 
District for wrist surgery in 2007.147 After a complication of intuba-
tion for general anesthesia, Kalitan suffered a perforated esopha-
gus.148 When Kalitan awakened from surgery, she complained of 
extreme pain in her chest and back.149 The anesthesiologist admin-
istered medication for chest pain and discharged Kalitan.150 The fol-
lowing day, Kalitan was found unresponsive and was rushed to the 
emergency room.151 Kalitan underwent lifesaving emergency sur-
gery to repair her esophagus.152 Subsequently, Kalitan was in a med-
ically induced coma in the intensive care unit for several weeks.153 
Further, she required several additional surgeries and intensive ther-
apy in order to regain mobility and the ability to eat normally.154 
Kalitan testified to experiencing continuing pain, serious mental dis-
orders, and loss of independence all caused by the traumatic inci-
dent.155 
The jury awarded Kalitan a total of USD $4 million in non-eco-
nomic damages: USD $2 million for past pain and suffering and 
USD $2 million for future pain and suffering.156 However, the trial 
court capped the non-economic damage award to around USD $2 
                                                                                                             
 144 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2. (stating that all-natural persons are equal before the 
law); Kalitan, 219 So. 3d at 56; McCall, 134 So. 3d at 900–01. 
 145 Kalitan, 219 So. 3d at 56; McCall, 134 So. 3d at 894 (holding that the non-
economic damage award cap in wrongful death actions was unconstitutional as a 
violation of equal protection). 
 146 Kalitan, 219 So. 3d at 50. 
 147 Id. at 51. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Kalitan, 219 So. 3d at 51. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. at 52. 
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million, in accordance with Section 766.118, Florida Statutes.157 In 
addition, the trial court denied Kalitan’s challenge to the constitu-
tionality of the statutory caps on non-economic damages in medical 
negligence actions.158 
In 2015, the Fourth District Court of Appeal disagreed with the 
trial court; instead, relying on McCall to hold that, in personal injury 
medical malpractice actions, the statutory non-economic damage 
award caps are unconstitutional.159 The Fourth District recognized 
that although McCall was limited to the context of wrongful death 
actions, the decision still applied in this case because Section 
766.118, Florida Statutes, applies to both wrongful death and per-
sonal injury actions.160 Thus, the district court ordered the trial court 
to issue the jury’s total damage award.161 
The Supreme Court of Florida granted review of Kalitan, ad-
dressing the issue of the constitutionality of the non-economic dam-
age caps in medical malpractice actions imposed by Sections 
766.118(2) and (3), Florida Statutes.162 The court first looked to 
McCall to decide its approach in Kalitan.163 
In McCall, in 2014, the Supreme Court of Florida addressed 
whether the statutory cap on non-economic damage awards set forth 
in Section 766.118, Florida Statutes, violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Florida Constitution.164 The plaintiff, Michelle 
McCall, received prenatal care at a United States Air Force medical 
                                                                                                             
 157 See FLA. STAT. § 766.118 (2011) (limiting non-economic damages for neg-
ligence of practitioner defendants and non-practitioner defendants); Kalitan, 219 
So. 3d at 52. 
 158 See FLA. STAT. § 766.118 (2011); Kalitan, 219 So. 3d at 52. 
 159 Kalitan, 219 So. 3d at 51; McCall, 134 So. 3d at 894 (holding that the non-
economic damage award cap in wrongful death actions was unconstitutional). 
 160 Kalitan, 219 So. 3d at 52. 
 161 Id. 
 162 See FLA. STAT. § 766.118(2) (2011) (limiting non-economic damage 
awards for negligence of practitioners to $500,000, or $1 million for negligence 
of practitioners resulting in a permanent vegetative state or death); see also FLA. 
STAT. § 766.118(3) (2011) (limiting non-economic damage awards for negligence 
of non-practitioners to USD $750,000, or $1.5 million for negligence of non-prac-
titioners resulting in permanent vegetative state or death); Kalitan, 219 So. 3d at 
52–53. 
 163 Kalitan, 219 So. 3d at 53–54. 
 164 See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2; see also FLA. STAT. § 766.118(2) (2011); see 
also FLA. STAT. § 766.118(3) (2011); McCall, 134 So. 3d at 897. 
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clinic.165 In her last trimester, McCall suffered from high blood pres-
sure and severe preeclampsia.166 Her labor was induced by the fam-
ily practice department, rather than the OB/GYN department, at Fort 
Walton Beach Medical Center.167 McCall delivered a healthy baby 
boy; however, the Air Force family practice physicians were unable 
to manually extract her placenta.168 The Air Force family practice 
physicians called Dr. Archibald, an Air Force obstetrician, for assis-
tance.169 Unbeknownst to the family practice physicians, McCall’s 
blood pressure began to drop rapidly.170 The nurse anesthetist re-
ported to Dr. Archibald that McCall’s vitals were stable, failing to 
inform Dr. Archibald of McCall’s dangerously low blood pres-
sure.171 Dr. Archibald never checked McCall’s vital signs him-
self.172 Subsequently, McCall went into shock and cardiac arrest due 
to severe blood loss and never recovered.173 The Estate of McCall 
filed suit, and the district court concluded that the non-economic 
damages totaled USD $2 million.174 In addition, the district court 
limited the recovery of wrongful death non-economic damages to 
USD $1 million in accordance with Section 766.118(2), Florida 
Statutes.175 The district court denied the Estate’s constitutional chal-
lenge to the statutory cap on wrongful death non-economic damages 
in medical malpractice actions.176 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit 
affirmed the application and constitutionality of the statutory cap 
under Article X of the Florida Constitution.177 However, the Elev-
enth Circuit granted the Estate’s motion to certify to the Supreme 
Court of Florida the constitutionality of the statutory cap under the 
Florida Constitution.178 
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The Supreme Court of Florida, in a plurality opinion, held that 
the statutory cap on wrongful death non-economic damages in med-
ical malpractice actions, under Section 766.118, Florida Statutes, vi-
olated the right to equal protection afforded by the Florida Consti-
tution.179 The court applied the rational basis test, stating that “a stat-
ute must bear a rational and reasonable relationship to a legitimate 
state objection, and it cannot be [arbitrarily] or capriciously im-
posed.”180 The court reasoned that the statutory cap failed because 
it imposed unfair and arbitrary burdens on injured plaintiffs when 
there were multiple claimants.181 The greater the number of survi-
vors and the greater their losses, the less likely they will be fully 
compensated.182 In addition, the statutory cap did not bear a rational 
relationship to its stated purpose: to address the medical malpractice 
insurance crisis in Florida.183 The court reasoned that “the Legisla-
ture’s determination that the increase in medical malpractice liabil-
ity insurance rates is forcing physicians to practice medicine without 
professional liability insurance, to leave Florida, to not perform 
high-risk procedures, or to retire early from the practice of medicine 
[was] unsupported.”184 Further, even if Florida were facing a medi-
cal malpractice insurance crisis, the statutory caps would not allevi-
ate such a crisis.185 Lastly, the plurality pointed out that statutes im-
plemented during times of crisis may become invalid because times 
of crisis are temporary.186 The concurring opinion agreed with the 
plurality opinion’s application of the rational relationship test, stat-
ing that “the arbitrary reduction of survivors’ non-economic dam-
ages in wrongful death cases based on the number of survivors lacks 
a rational relationship to the goal of reducing medical malpractice 
premiums.”187 
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In Kalitan, the Supreme Court of Florida considered the applica-
bility of McCall to the personal injury context.188 As in McCall, be-
cause Kalitan was not a member of a suspect class, the court applied 
the rational basis test.189 The court held that the statutory caps on 
non-economic damage awards in personal injury actions, imposed 
by Section 766.118, Florida Statutes, violated equal protection.190 
The statutory cap failed the rational basis test because “the arbitrary 
reduction of compensation without regard to the severity of the in-
jury does not bear a rational relationship to the Legislature’s stated 
interest in addressing the medical malpractice crisis.”191 The court 
agreed with the plurality and concurring opinions in McCall that 
there was no evidence of a continuing medical malpractice insur-
ance crisis to warrant the necessary implementation of the statutory 
cap.192 Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Florida concluded that 
Section 766.118, Florida Statutes, “unreasonably and arbitrarily 
limit[s] recovery of those most grievously injured by medical negli-
gence.”193 Because Section 766.118, Florida Statutes, was deemed 
unconstitutional, it was subsequently amended, most recently in 
2018.194 
B. Canada: The Trilogy of Fundamental Court Cases 
Establishing Canadian Tort Cap Law 
1. Introduction to the Trilogy 
Three cases—Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., Thornton 
v. Prince George School Dist. No. 57, and Arnold v. Teno—created 
the fundamental basis on which all following Canadian tort cap law 
relies. All three cases were decided by the Supreme Court of Canada 
                                                                                                             
 188 Kalitan, 219 So. 3d at 56. 
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in 1978, resulting in a “rough”195 upper limit on non-pecuniary dam-
age awards in personal injury actions.196 Adopting a functional ap-
proach,197 the Supreme Court of Canada determined that non-pecu-
niary damage awards should provide “solace” to injured plain-
tiffs.198 Solace requires that money is “used to buy substitutes with 
which to ameliorate the situation of the injured party,” meaning that 
any monetary award must be used to mitigate an injured plaintiff’s 
loss.199 Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Canada created the rough 
upper limits on non-pecuniary damage awards “as a result of the fear 
of largely extravagant awards likely to create an immense social bur-
den, as [was] presently the case in the United States, coupled with 
the fact that non-pecuniary damage awards are susceptible to exces-
sive claims, and that the victim has already been compensated for 
pecuniary loss,”200 reflecting, once again, the trend of the Canadian 
courts looking to the American courts for guidance.201 The non-pe-
cuniary damage award caps were designed to make awarding dam-
ages straightforward, to prevent excessive jury awards, and to pro-
vide a reasonable scope for awards.202 The trilogy indicates the Su-
preme Court of Canada’s “willingness to group cases according to 
the general issues they raise and to resolve these issues broadly, 
providing guidance for lower courts.”203 Further, the trilogy echoes 
the court’s interest in reasonable yet conventional non-pecuniary 
                                                                                                             
 195 Lee, B.C.C.A.159 at para. 10 (adjusting the set upper limit for inflation). 
 196 See id. at para. 1. 
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damage awards.204 Today, the trilogy is still considered to be good 
law and acts as binding precedent on lower courts.205 
a. Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd. 
In Andrews, a traffic accident left the plaintiff, James Andrews, 
a quadriplegic, facing a lifetime of dependency.206 The trial court 
awarded CAD $1,022,477.48 in damages, which was reduced by the 
Court of Appeals to CAD $516,544.48.207 The Supreme Court of 
Canada granted review as to the assessment of damages.208 The 
court held that the plaintiff should be awarded CAD $100,000 in 
non-pecuniary damages stating, “save in exceptional circumstances, 
this should be regarded as an upper limit of non-pecuniary loss in 
cases of this nature.”209 It is important to note that the Supreme 
Court of Canada established only a “rough” upper limit, meaning 
the limit could be exceeded in rare cases.210 After the Supreme Court 
of Canada’s decision in Andrews, “the search for solace through the 
acquisition of goods and services became the aim of the compensa-
tion of non-pecuniary damages in accordance with the functional 
view.”211 This trend was perpetuated by the two other cases in the 
trilogy. 
b. Thornton v. Prince George School Dist. No. 57 
In Thornton, an accident in a physical education class left eight-
een-year-old Gary Thornton a quadriplegic.212 Previously an all-
around athlete, the plaintiff attempted to do a somersault when he 
fractured his neck “with comminuted fracture of the fourth cervical 
vertebrae.”213 The plaintiff’s injuries resulted in either “total or par-
tial paralysis to each of his four limbs.”214 The trial court awarded 
                                                                                                             
 204 See Andrews, 2 S.C.R. at 261. 
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 207 Id. 
 208 Id. 
 209 Andrews, 2 S.C.R. at 233. 
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CAD $1,534,058.93 in damages.215 Subsequently, the Court of Ap-
peals reduced the damages award to CAD $649,628.87.216 The Su-
preme Court of Canada granted review as to the assessment of dam-
ages.217 Citing Andrews, the court held that the award for non-pecu-
niary damages should be reduced to CAD $100,000 in accordance 
with the rough upper limit.218 The court agreed with the Court of 
Appeals stating that the non-pecuniary losses experienced by 
Thornton were similar to that of the plaintiff in Andrews.219 The 
court reasoned that the plaintiff could not be “awarded perfect com-
pensation” and that fairness on each side was essential to the princi-
ples of judicial consistency and reasonableness.220 
c. Arnold v. Teno 
In Arnold, the four-and-a-half-year-old plaintiff, Diane Teno, 
was struck by a car while crossing the street after purchasing ice 
cream from an ice cream truck.221 Subsequently, Teno suffered sig-
nificant physical and mental impairments.222 The trial court awarded 
the plaintiff CAD $200,000 in non-pecuniary damages and CAD 
$750,000 in pecuniary damages.223 The Court of Appeals lessened 
the award for pecuniary damages by CAD $75,000.224 The defend-
ants appealed, and the Supreme Court of Canada granted review.225 
The Supreme Court of Canada stated that “[t]here should be uni-
formity, always allowing flexibility to meet each differing individ-
ual case, in awards for non-pecuniary damages.”226 Citing Andrews 
and Thornton, the court held that the award of CAD $100,000 in 
non-pecuniary damages was proper in this case.227 The court’s rea-
soning involved a comparison between the plaintiff Teno’s injuries 
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and the plaintiffs’ injuries in Andrews and Thornton.228 Like the 
plaintiffs in Andrews and Thornton, the plaintiff in this case, alt-
hough not paralyzed, suffered a significant physical and mental dis-
ability.229 Unlike the plaintiffs in Andrews and Thornton, the plain-
tiff in this case would not require frequent treatment; however, the 
court reasoned that the award was proper because the plaintiff in this 
case had a longer life expectancy and would suffer continuous em-
barrassment throughout her life.230 Further, the court emphasized the 
soaring non-pecuniary damage awards in the United States as rea-
soning for capping the non-pecuniary damage award at the rough 
upper limit.231 
2. The Supreme Court of Canada’s Reasoning Behind 
the Trilogy 
Throughout the trilogy, the Supreme Court of Canada gave a 
number of reasons for setting the upper limits on non-pecuniary 
damage awards. First, the court was responding to escalating dam-
ages awards in the United States.232 Second, the court cited the need 
for national consistency to damage awards.233 Third, the court 
stressed the importance of considering the social burden of large 
non-pecuniary damage awards.234 
In Andrews and Arnold, both Justice Dickson and Justice Spence 
respectively referenced soaring non-economic damage awards in the 
United States as support for non-pecuniary damage caps in Can-
ada.235 In Andrews, Justice Dickson stated that “the subject of dam-
ages for personal injury is an area of law which cries out for legisla-
tive reform.”236 Justice Dickson further noted that non-pecuniary 
damage awards may be “widely extravagant,” observing that non-
economic damage awards had recently soared in the United 
States.237 Likewise, in Arnold, Justice Spence referenced increasing 
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non-economic damage awards in the United States, specifically in 
the area of medical malpractice.238 Justice Spence said, “We have a 
right to fear a situation where none but the very wealthy could own 
or drive automobiles because none but the very wealthy could afford 
to pay the enormous insurance premiums which would be required 
by insurers to meet such exorbitant awards.”239 Further, Justice 
Spence agreed with Justice Dickson that the impossibility and sub-
jectivity of assessment and compensation of such losses makes non-
pecuniary damage caps necessary.240 
In Andrews, Justice Dickson stressed the need for uniformity of 
such awards throughout Canada, but noted that flexibility for greater 
compensation was necessary in certain cases and under changing 
economic circumstances.241 This again demonstrates the court’s pri-
oritization of social good over legal theory.242 Justice Dickson stated 
that such variation should not be determined by a victim’s prov-
ince.243 Nevertheless, Justice Dickson emphasized the need for caps 
or “guidelines for the translation into monetary terms what has been 
lost.”244 Likewise, in Arnold, Justice Spence agreed with Justice 
Dickson, citing “uniformity of awards” as a key reason for non-pe-
cuniary damage limits; however, like Justice Dickson, Justice 
Spence also emphasized the need for flexibility in certain cases.245 
In Andrews, Justice Dickson emphasized the significance of the 
social burden of excessive non-pecuniary damage awards.246 He 
stated that “the sheer fact is that there is no objective yardstick for 
translating non-pecuniary losses, such as pain and suffering and loss 
of amenities, into monetary terms” was reason enough to consider 
“other policy factors” when evaluating the moderation of non-pecu-
niary damage awards.247 
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3. Canadian Courts Beyond the Trilogy 
Generally, after the Supreme Court’s trilogy of cases, Canadian 
courts have “ignored the trilogy cases; paid lip service to them by 
noting that they had considered the comments of the Supreme Court 
in setting an award; distinguished them; or followed the Supreme 
Court’s action in claiming to use the ‘functional’ approach . . . .”248 
The following cases give examples and insight into these departures. 
a. Lindal v. Lindal 
Three years after the trilogy, in Lindal v. Lindal, the Supreme 
Court of Canada discussed what circumstances would allow the trial 
court to render an award that exceeded the non-pecuniary damage 
cap set forth in the trilogy.249 The court followed the solace analysis, 
concluding that it was not beneficial to quantify the difference in 
worth between the losses caused by the severity of different inju-
ries.250 In Lindal, the plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident 
while riding as a passenger in his brother’s car.251 Lindal suffered 
permanent and severe physical and mental impairments.252 The trial 
court awarded CAD $135,000 in non-pecuniary damages, reasoning 
that exceptional circumstances justified an award in excess of the 
non-pecuniary damage award cap.253 The Court of Appeals re-
versed, and the Supreme Court of Canada granted review.254 The 
Supreme Court of Canada held that the caps may not be extended 
based on the severity of a plaintiff’s injury alone or “to compensate 
for loss of amenities, but rather to provide compensation for loss of 
amenities in order to ameliorate the victim’s condition and make his 
life more bearable.”255 The court stated that the circumstances that 
justify exceeding the upper limit were extremely rare.256 However, 
the court did agree that the limits may be altered due to changing 
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economic conditions or inflation.257 Justice Dickson noted that “it is 
fruitless to attempt to put a dollar value on the loss of a faculty in 
the way that we put a dollar value on the loss of a piece of prop-
erty.”258 As in Andrews, Justice Dickson stressed the importance of 
considering the social impact of non-pecuniary damage awards for 
the following three reasons: (1) the awards for severely injured 
plaintiffs may be virtually limitless; (2) plaintiffs are already wholly 
compensated for loss of future earnings; and, (3) non-pecuniary 
damages awards are not necessarily “compensatory.”259 While con-
senting that placing upper limits on non-pecuniary damage awards 
is arbitrary, Justice Dickson thus endorsed the caps in personal in-
jury cases.260 Ultimately, the court held that the circumstances in this 
case did not justify exceeding the non-pecuniary damage cap even 
though Lindal’s injuries were different from those suffered by the 
plaintiffs in the trilogy.261 
b. Ter Neuzen v. Korn 
In 1995, in Ter Neuzen v. Korn,262 the Supreme Court of Canada 
again reinforced the position that limits on non-pecuniary damage 
awards were now a “rule of law.”263 There, the plaintiff contracted 
HIV after undergoing artificial insemination.264 The jury awarded 
CAD $460,000 in non-pecuniary damages, and the Court of Appeals 
set aside the verdict.265 Similar to Lindal, the Supreme Court of Can-
ada discussed the circumstances that would warrant exceeding the 
non-pecuniary damage award cap.266 The Supreme Court of Canada 
cited Lindal and established that when a jury award surpasses the 
rough upper limit, it should be reduced as a matter of law.267 As in 
Lindal, the court held that although the plaintiff’s injuries differed 
from that of the plaintiffs in the trilogy, the cost of the social burden 
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outweighed that factor.268 Therefore, a non-pecuniary damage 
award that exceeded the non-pecuniary damage cap would be inap-
propriate in this case.269 
c. Lee v. Dawson 
In 2006, Lee v. Dawson challenged the non-pecuniary damage 
cap set forth by the trilogy.270 The seventeen-year-old plaintiff, Ik 
Sang Lee, was injured in an automobile accident.271 The plaintiff 
suffered a traumatic brain injury and severe physical injuries.272 The 
jury awarded CAD $2,000,000 in non-pecuniary damages, exceed-
ing the rough upper limit.273 The trial court subsequently reduced 
the award to the upper limit, which was CAD $294,600 at the 
time.274 The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeal for British 
Columbia, and the plaintiff cross-appealed seeking to reinstate the 
jury’s damage award.275 The Supreme Court of Canada denied re-
view without reason.276 
The plaintiff argued that the non-pecuniary damage cap set forth 
in the trilogy discriminated against persons injured in civil negli-
gence actions, which was inconsistent with Section 15 of the Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.277 Section 15 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides an equality and non-dis-
crimination guarantee.278 The plaintiff further asserted that the court 
would not be bound by stare decisis if it found that the non-pecuni-
ary damage cap set forth by the trilogy was inconsistent with the 
values of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.279 The 
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plaintiff argued that the damage limits resulted in deferential treat-
ment, favoring plaintiffs who are not severely injured.280 The plain-
tiff further reasoned that, “[t]hose less seriously injured plaintiffs are 
not subject to any limit because courts are to assess non-pecuniary 
damages without regard for the upper limit until the limit is 
reached.”281 
While the court found the plaintiff’s argument persuasive, citing 
Ter Neuzen and Lindal, the court held that it was bound by the tril-
ogy.282 However, the court ultimately agreed that non-pecuniary 
damage caps need to be revisited by the Supreme Court of Canada 
in the future.283 
In refusing to grant review without reason in Lee, the Supreme 
Court of Canada dismissed “the opportunity to provide comprehen-
sive guidance and current reasons on the status of the upper limit.”284 
The Supreme Court of Canada has maintained that the law set forth 
by the trilogy is binding precedent and remains good law.285 
IV. ARGUMENT 
Ultimately, this article argues that a recent and a critical shift is 
taking place—namely, that the highest level of courts in American 
States (like the Supreme Court of Florida) and Canadian Provinces 
are holding statutory non-economic damage caps unconstitutional 
as a violation of equal protection and that such trend will translate 
to Canada as well. Not only does Canada continuously look to the 
United States for guidance, but the statutory non-economic damage 
caps do not serve the purpose suggested by the government. Further, 
the purported policy reasons behind the caps lacks evidentiary sup-
port. In sum, this article predicts that because the Supreme Court of 
Canada is not strictly bound by stare decisis, the Supreme Court of 
Canada will follow the shift in the United States and hold that non-
economic damage caps violate equal protection. 
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A. Comparing Lee and Kalitan: The Equal Protection Argument 
The plaintiffs in both Lee and Kalitan asserted equal protection 
arguments, questioning the constitutionality of the government im-
posed non-economic damage award caps.286 
The Supreme Court of Florida was convinced in Kalitan that the 
non-economic damage caps violated equal protection under the ra-
tional basis test.287 To meet the rational basis test, “a statute must 
bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state objective,” and can-
not be arbitrarily imposed.288 Here, the plaintiff, Kalitan, met her 
burden by proving that the statutory caps on personal injury non-
economic damages in medical negligence actions did not bear a ra-
tional relationship to the state of Florida’s objective of alleviating 
the alleged medical malpractice crisis and such caps were arbitrarily 
imposed.289 The court was convinced that the damage caps “created 
arbitrary distinctions between classes of medical malpractice vic-
tims, and they unreasonably and arbitrarily limited recovery of those 
most grievously injured by medical negligence.”290 Further, the 
court agreed that “even if caps were rationally related to a legitimate 
government purpose when the statute was enacted, no evidence of 
continuing crisis justified arbitrary application of the caps that dis-
criminated between medical malpractice victims.”291 
The Supreme Court of Canada declined to hear Lee without rea-
son.292 Although the Court of Appeals was convinced by plaintiff 
Lee’s argument, the Court of Appeals was unable to overrule the 
established precedent to rule in Lee’s favor.293 The plaintiff argued 
that the non-pecuniary damage caps allowed those plaintiffs who 
suffered less serious losses to be fully and fairly compensated, while 
those plaintiffs suffering from more serious losses would not be.294 
Further, the plaintiff asserted that “the fact that juries are not in-
formed of the cap unless the plaintiff has sustained a serious injury 
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underscores the point that plaintiffs with less serious injuries have 
the advantage of a jury’s assessment of their damages without the 
constraints imposed by the cap.”295 The plaintiff cited a decision of 
the Supreme Court of Alabama, Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Associ-
ation.296 In Moore, the plaintiff, Moore, challenged a statutory non-
economic damage cap in medical malpractice actions.297 The court 
held that the cap was unconstitutional as a violation of equal protec-
tion because it favored those plaintiffs who were less severely in-
jured.298 Similarly, Lee ultimately asserted that “[i]n failing to per-
mit full compensation for serious injury and loss, the common law 
perpetuates the disadvantage of people who are already disadvan-
taged.”299 Further, Lee stated that “the effect of the cap is the impo-
sition of an extra layer of discrimination to the plight of the disabled 
in our society, who, unfortunately, face many challenges as a result 
of prevailing social attitudes and the lack of accessibility of jobs, 
education, and society generally.”300 Lastly, Lee argued that the 
non-pecuniary damage caps were selected arbitrarily, without “cor-
respondence between the non-pecuniary damages available to a 
plaintiff and the needs, capacity, or circumstances of the disabled 
plaintiff.”301 
As in Florida, one of the Supreme Court of Canada’s justifica-
tions of the non-pecuniary damage caps set forth in the trilogy was 
the desire to avoid skyrocketing insurance premiums.302 However, 
Lee argued that “a law that deprives plaintiffs of legitimate damages 
in order to avoid an increase in premiums for other people, has a 
discriminatory purpose.”303 Rejecting Lee’s argument, the court 
cited Lindal, stating that “the Supreme Court of Canada has clearly 
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indicated that the amount of non-pecuniary damages should not de-
pend solely on the severity of the injury, ‘but upon its ability to ame-
liorate the condition of the victim considering his or her particular 
situation.’”304 Lee asserted additional arguments to emphasize the 
need to re-examine the justifications for the damage caps and the 
“conceptual and practical difficulties” in its application.305 Addi-
tionally, Lee asserted that the trilogy’s purported “rough” upper lim-
its have unintentionally become a strict rule of law, rather than a 
guideline as it was originally intended.306 Further, the policy reasons 
justifying the trilogy’s rough upper limit—namely, increased insur-
ance premiums set over twenty-five years ago—no longer ex-
isted.307 Ultimately, the court agreed with the plaintiff, Lee, stating 
that “the time may have come for the rationalization or conceptual 
underpinning for having a rough upper limit on non-pecuniary dam-
ages to be re-examined.”308 However, the court felt that it was in no 
position to overturn the precedent set forth in the trilogy.”309 
B. The Justification for Statutory Damage Caps in Florida: The 
Malpractice Liability Insurance Crisis 
In McCall, the Florida Legislature (the “Legislature”) alleged 
that the justification for the non-economic damage cap was “a med-
ical malpractice insurance crisis of unprecedented magnitude.”310 
The Legislature noted that excessive damage awards by runaway ju-
ries resulted in increased malpractice liability insurance premi-
ums.311 Furthermore, the Legislature asserted that increased mal-
practice liability insurance premiums resulted in the following: phy-
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sicians fleeing Florida, physicians retiring early, and physicians re-
fusing to perform high-risk procedures.312 However, such allega-
tions were unfounded.313 Government reports indicated an increased 
number of physicians throughout Florida and provided no evidence 
of increased frivolous lawsuits or exorbitant jury verdicts.314 Re-
gardless of the existence of the medical malpractice liability insur-
ance crisis, the non-economic damage caps would not alleviate such 
a crisis.315 Ultimately, the plurality and concurring opinions in 
McCall agreed that the existence of non-economic damages caps 
would not lessen insurance rates.316 While the statutory damage caps 
resulted in savings for insurance companies, such savings did not 
translate to decreased insurance premiums for physicians.317 Fur-
ther, the court reasoned that although the statutory caps may have 
been enacted during a malpractice liability insurance crisis, a crisis 
is not a permanent condition.318 Once again citing flexibility, the 
court stated, “Conditions can change, which remove or negate the 
justification for a law, transforming what may have once been rea-
sonable into arbitrary and irrational legislation.”319 As a result, the 
court in Kalitan adopted the findings of the court in McCall, that 
there was no evidence of a continuing malpractice liability insurance 
crisis in Florida.320 Furthermore, the court in Kalitan agreed that 
even if a malpractice liability insurance crisis existed, the statutory 
caps would not be justified.321 
C. The Justifications for Statutory Damage Caps in Canada 
Non-pecuniary damage award caps “unfairly impact those who 
are victims of personal injury and whose situations could be im-
proved by a reasonable award.”322 By upholding the non-pecuniary 
damage award caps, the Supreme Court of Canada has essentially 
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prioritized consistency and simplicity of judgments rather than jus-
tice for the most severely injured plaintiffs.323 The impact of the Su-
preme Court of Canada’s “refusal to address the question posed by 
Lee was to pass up the opportunity to provide comprehensive guid-
ance and current reasons on the status of the upper limit.”324 Further, 
as a result of the Supreme Court of Canada’s refusal to hear the 
plaintiff’s argument in Lee, the constitutionality of the non-pecuni-
ary damage caps remains uncertain.325 Future clarification is essen-
tial to resolve such ambiguity.326 
The Supreme Court of Canada looked to the United States to 
support its assertion that increased insurance premiums would result 
from exorbitant damage awards.327 However, the evidence provided 
was misleading and lacked factual backing.328 The Supreme Court 
of Canada’s decision to enforce the non-pecuniary damage caps 
“was based on an apprehension of crisis in the insurance industry 
and the costs of insurance” and made without any material evi-
dence.329 High damage awards and non-pecuniary loss are not the 
sole reason for high insurance premiums.330 Other factors that in-
crease insurance premiums include the following: “poor claims con-
trol, inadequate standards of practice and financial mismanage-
ment.”331 Further, in reality, “[t]he perception of an insurance crisis 
[in both the United States and Canada] was being fostered by a vig-
orous publicity campaign conducted by the insurance industry.”332 
“If a decision is to be taken that someone who has been injured is to 
be deprived, on the ground of social costs . . . that decision should 
rest on a firmer basis than the cursory examination of the experience 
of another jurisdiction.”333 Further, “[i]t is particularly troubling that 
a misleading view of that experience may have been fostered by an 
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extensive advertising campaign sponsored by interested parties.”334 
Non-economic damage caps not only lack sufficient justification, 
but the caps also fail to effectively lower insurance premiums. 
D. Non-Economic Damage Caps: Do the Ends Justify the 
Means? 
As suggested in McCall and Kalitan, the non-economic damage 
caps do not effectuate their stated purpose.335 The caps in Canada 
also fail for similar reasons, as suggested in Lee.336 There is uncer-
tainty as to the association between non-economic damage caps and 
insurance premiums.337 However, “non-economic damage caps 
seem to be only a small factor affecting increases in malpractice in-
surance rates.”338 Some studies conducted within the United States 
suggest that damage caps effectively reduce medical liability insur-
ance premiums.339 The presumption is that once non-economic dam-
age caps are legislated, medical insurance providers reduce insur-
ance premiums due to decreased risk exposure.340 However, in prac-
tice, states that have adopted non-economic damage caps show that 
premiums are unlikely to be reduced due to uncertainty surrounding 
the constitutionality of the damage award limits.341 Further, some 
studies found no association between non-economic damage caps 
and insurance premiums altogether.342 
The principal advantages to the non-pecuniary damage caps in-
clude decreased litigation and increased judicial consistency and ef-
ficiency of evaluation of non-pecuniary loss.343 Namely, some non-
pecuniary damage limit may be “essential to ensure consistency, 
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fairness, and the application of rational principles in assessing dam-
ages for personal injury.”344 Non-pecuniary damage award caps may 
be reasonable by allowing “a substantial sum of money to be allo-
cated for the purchase of substitute pleasures without going to ridic-
ulous extremes.”345 Non-pecuniary damages are unquantifiable 
monetarily and are therefore necessarily arbitrary to some degree.346 
Further, removing the non-pecuniary damage caps in Canada “may 
upset the balance that has been arrived at in determining fair com-
pensation.”347 However, doing away with damage award caps 
“would not alter the fact that compensation for loss consists of in-
terrelated considerations.”348 
There are significant disadvantages to non-pecuniary damage 
award caps, principally that non-pecuniary damage award caps vio-
late the constitutional rights of plaintiffs.349 Such caps may be un-
necessary to impose non-pecuniary damage awards and are unlikely 
to increase, except to account for inflation.350 The non-pecuniary 
damage caps created by the Supreme Court of Canada and continu-
ously imposed by the trilogy have proven “not to be moderate but in 
many cases wholly inadequate.”351 Non-pecuniary damage caps 
have “created a situation where victims of massive injuries are re-
ceiving only marginally more than victims of less severe inju-
ries.”352 Ultimately, “an upper limit, designed to suppress damages 
for non-pecuniary loss to a moderate level, has affected the meas-
urement of these damages at every level.”353 
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An analysis of large Canadian claims found that non-pecuniary 
damages made up 15% of the aggregate awards, while non-eco-
nomic damages in United States medical negligence claims repre-
sented nearly half of the aggregate awards.354 Further, “empirical 
studies in [Canada] have found that states355 with caps on damages 
in medical malpractice cases have reduced overall claims severity 
by 23% to 40%.”356 “Awards of increasingly high non-economic 
damages in medical liability cases, with the resulting impact on the 
cost of liability insurance and the availability of care in some cases, 
led to the passage in many states of limits on non-economic damages 
or, in some cases, to limits on total damages recoverable in medical 
negligence actions.”357 Further, “a number of those limits were sub-
sequently struck down by state courts as unconstitutional, although 
a number were upheld, and the issue of limits on non-economic 
damages remains a flash point in the debate over reform.”358 
V. CONCLUSION 
The future remains uncertain as to whether Canada will follow 
the shift in the United States, and Florida specifically, and reverse 
the trilogy to rule that non-economic damage award caps should be 
eliminated altogether. The need for and the fairness of non-eco-
nomic damage award caps has been repeatedly questioned in recent 
years and will likely be the subject of litigation in the future. 
In Kalitan, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the statutory 
limits359 imposed on non-economic damages in medical negligence 
suits violated the Florida Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause.360 
Similarly, in Lee, the plaintiff argued that the non-pecuniary damage 
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cap set forth in the trilogy discriminated against persons injured in 
civil negligence actions, which is inconsistent with Section Fifteen 
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.361 Section Fifteen 
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides an equal-
ity and non-discrimination guarantee.362 The court in Lee upheld the 
non-pecuniary damage award cap because it was bound  by stare 
decisis, namely, the precedent established by the trilogy.363 Alt-
hough the “rough” upper limit to non-pecuniary damage awards pro-
posed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Andrews was initially a 
guideline, the Supreme Court of Canada’s holding in Lindal essen-
tially made such limit a rule of law.364 However, the court in Lee 
reasoned that “the rationalization or conceptual underpinning for 
having a rough upper limit on non-pecuniary damages [should] be 
re-examined.”365 Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Canada declined 
to hear Lee without reason.366 Lee likely is not the last word on non-
pecuniary damage award caps in Canada.367 It is still possible for the 
Supreme Court of Canada to reassess its previous decisions, but 
“[w]hen and whether that will happen, however, remains to be 
seen.”368 
There are significant disadvantages to non-pecuniary damage 
award caps, principally that non-economic damage caps violate the 
constitutional rights of plaintiffs.369 Non-pecuniary damage award 
caps likely do not effectuate their stated purpose. The Supreme 
Court of Canada looked to the United States to support its assertion 
that increased insurance premiums would result from exorbitant 
damage awards.370 However, the evidence provided is misleading 
and lacks factual basis.371 The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision 
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to enforce the non-pecuniary damage caps “was based on an appre-
hension of crisis in the insurance industry and the costs of insur-
ance,” without any material evidence, and was made nearly forty 
years ago.372 
There is significant doubt as to a correlation between non-eco-
nomic damage caps and insurance premiums.373 Although there are 
some advantages to the non-pecuniary damage award cap, including 
decreased litigation and increased judicial consistency and effi-
ciency of evaluation of non-pecuniary loss,374 such advantages 
likely do not outweigh the substantial costs. The non-pecuniary 
damage caps created by the Supreme Court of Canada and continu-
ously imposed by the trilogy have proven “not to be moderate but in 
many cases wholly inadequate.”375 Non-pecuniary damage caps 
have “created a situation where victims of massive injuries are re-
ceiving only marginally more than victims of less severe inju-
ries.”376 Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Canada should revisit the 
issue of the non-pecuniary damage award rough upper limits in the 
interest of fairness and justice.377 The Supreme Court of Canada 
should consider the shift in the United States and abolish the non-
pecuniary damage award caps as they are unconstitutional. 
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